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ARTICLE INFO                                    ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The politicization of religion in the last few decades has created a climate ripe for religious resurgence 
in all areas of the world.  The decreased role of religion among societies and effective secularization 
and modernization of the West have directly influence opposing factors of “religious resurgence”, 
“religious fundamentalism”, and “religious revivalism” as a sense of cultural preservation and 
balancing new social, economic, emotional and interllectural side effects of modernization growth 
(Sahliyeh, 1990).  The effects of religious resurgence on Muslim Lebanese women’s efforts to enhance 
their freedom, equity, and civil rights need to be explored thoroughly to provide an adequate analysis 
of the current needs of women living under religious verdicts.  A survey of 284 Lebanese university 
student subjects, between the ages of 18-35, regarding attitudes toward women during religious 
resurgence was conducted over a period of five years.  From the 284 subjects in this study, 124 women 
also reported self-assessment levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction. The authors delineate the 
interconnectedness among Lebanese women’s religiosity, self-esteem, and life satisfaction levels.  
Relationships among attitudes toward women, the number of laws enacted to support women’s rights 
and equality, and religious resurgence are also assessed.  The results of this study suggest that religious 
resurgence tends to reinforce a bias against women from both secular and religious authorities.  Thus, 
Muslim Lebanese women are vulnerable from within this framework and likely to continue to face 
major challenges in efforts to enhance their freedom, equity, and civil rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Religious resurgence is one of theocracy’s developmental 
stages. According to, (Kaplan et al., 1996). “Religious 
resurgence” is a form of religious zealotry by which self-styled 
“true-believers” endeavor to establish religious identity, revive 
the religious community, and institute alternatives to secular 
society.  Such a religious resurgence occurred in Lebanon 
during the long civil war from 1975 to 1991.  As an indicator of 
an emerging theocracy, religious resurgence is also an indicator 
of the demise of women’s freedom, liberty, and equitable job 
opportunities, and the demise of democracy as well.  This is 
possible because negative legislation enacted during such 
resurgence, as well as the attitudes, myths, misperceptions, and 
stereotypes held about women, even by women, have led to the 
formulation and implementation of public policies designed to 
hinder women’s human and civil rights, and eventually a 
nation’s democracy (e.g., Afghanistan, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen).  There are forty anti-government, 
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low-intensity conflicts documented and afflicting contemporary 
international quasi-democracies. Thirty four of these entities 
were founded because of Islamic religious resurgence, 
(Appleby et al., 2000).This study focused on the effects of 
religion on the perception of women’s freedom and human 
rights in Lebanon.  This research is urgently needed to elucidate 
the rights of women in Lebanon in the current political climate, 
their adjustment to this religious resurgence and progress 
within the current societal , not only in Lebanon but also in all 
developing societies. Muslim Lebanese women were selected 
to be recruited for participation in this research study for 
several reasons. Lebanon provides a unique political 
environment that permits the isolation of the effects of Islamic 
religious oppression on women.  
 
Muslim Lebanese women’s personal freedom and civil rights 
are not governed by national or local laws but by religious 
mandates as interpreted by individual sectarian rule, which 
involves “personal status codes” derived from Islamic law.  
Each of Lebanon’s 18 official sects (Salamay et al., 2009), 
possess a distinct personal status code that governs the 
domestic and personal affairs of women.  “Status Codes” are 
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derived from ijtihad, religious interpretation of the Quran and 
Sunnah, by male scholars and constitute aposteriori knowledge 
through patriarchal interpretations of religious text, (Tabet et 
al., 2005). Although some Islamic groups resist Western 
influences and rely on pure Sharia interpretation of women’s 
rights, the sects continue to be immersed in the Western 
subculture and thus share many universal attributes amenable to 
cross-cultural comparative analysis.  
 
Religious resurgence within the Middle and Near East has 
converged democracies and constitutional monarchies with 
religious identities.  This resurgence has several common and 
unifying goals across countries, primarily to expel the “sweet 
lethal poison” of “Westoxification”, (Kramer Kramer et al., 
1991). Politically, the Middle and Near Eastern states range 
from “theocratic monarchism” (e.g., Saudi Arabia) to “radical 
Islamist governments” (Iran and Libya), and “authoritarian 
privatizing states” (Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt).  However, 
because of the religious nature of this resurgence and 
interconnectedness of the “Umma”, all can be labeled as 
“theocracies”, (Hirschl, 2009). Theocracy is a form of civil 
government in which “God” (Allah) is recognized as the sole 
authority over state affairs.Theocracy is the sole concept of 
“state” and the only recognized authority in Islamic Sharia, 
which derives laws solely from the Quran and Hadith, 
(Lombardi, 2013). However, ijtihad is also an Islamic concept 
derived from the Quran, which involves reinterpretation of 
Islamic laws by Muslim scholars and jurists through personal 
thought and reflection, and may lead the way to providing a 
way forward in changing the “Status Codes” for women in 
territories that are primarily Muslim. (Harasani et al., 2013), 
 
In addition to theocracy, Lebanese women have to overcome 
the nation’s official “confessional” political system, (Dedeyan, 
2005). In this system, public offices are assigned according to 
religious group.  For example, according to Makdisi (2005), the 
nation’s president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime 
minister must be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the house 
must be a Shi’a Muslim. Parliament must be divided equally 
between Christians and Muslims. However, because of 
stipulations from Sharia Law, the overwhelming majority of 
government officials are men. Therefore, we postulate that the 
synergistic effects of religious resurgence and theocracy restrict 
women’s movements for freedom and equality and are 
obstacles to their development (Backer et al., 2008). 
“Segregation” and “separation” provide a central theme 
underlying the oppression of Lebanese women. According to 
the ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 17, 1954, in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the separate but equal doctrine 
that governed U.S. social policies from 1896 to 1954 was 
inherently oppressive. Separate was by definition “unequaland 
was inconsistent with the concept of equality before the law 
established by the American Constitution. (Price, 2001),  
Similar theocratic rules currently segregate women from men in 
a Muslim society that adheres to strict Shari’a Law 
interpretation for social, political, and personal realms of life.   
 
Thistype of religious interpretation of gender segregation 
provides fertile ground for “separation” leading to 
“oppression”, when the separation implies that one party is 
unable to participate in law making, judicial decisions, and 
implementation of the laws that are enforced.One of the 
physical methods of “segregation” leading to “oppression” as 
interpreted by Western philosophy is the idea of women and the 
“head covering” (“hijab”) and “face covering” (“veil” or 
“niqab”). For women living in Islamic society, hijab is a 
mandatory requirement for female believers according to 
Quran and niqabis recommended by the Sunnah(Prophet 
Muhammed’s teachings).  The question remains, “Is a woman 
who wears hijab or niqab because of religious requirement, 
“oppressed” or “subjugated” by Sharia Laws or is hijab a 
personal right and freedom that should be left unmanaged by 
unattached Western feminists who pose as “saviors of the 
oppressed? (Danchin et al., 2012). ”Perhaps the answer to that 
question lies in pluralisms  that may not simplify the legalities 
based upon the cloth itself, but in the intention of the woman 
behind the hijab or niqab.  Was the hijab or niqaba choice 
given to women as part of their unique personal belief system?   
Are women free to choose to wear or not wear the hijab or 
niqab? Or is the decision of a woman left to male elites, created 
as a legal requirement (legal requirement to veil or to unveil in 
order to participate in society) aimed at discrediting her choice 
of clothing? Research suggests many Muslim women choose to 
veil to preserve their gender difference and identification, 
others utilize it as a religious or cultural statement. (Greene, 
2013), Dichotomous oppressions ensue in pluralsocieties, one 
that embraces the “veil” as a mandatory religious requirement 
that omits women from intellectual contribution and the other 
that forbids a woman wear the “veil” as part of an oppressive 
punishment for religious belief.  
 
 Neither ruleconsiders the individual preferences of the woman 
for whom such a law is rendered justice within a particular 
culture or society.  The answer is not yet clear how a country as 
diverse as Lebanon would react to such religious rule.  
However, if the primary intent behind legally requiring “veiling 
or unveiling” is forced and created for the purpose of 
“separation of women from any part of society”, then inequality 
is the underlying outcome for women who live under such a 
regime. Forced separation based on gender is inherently 
oppressive (Allen et al., 2008).However, by not providing a 
choice to women, to veil or not to veil, women are subjugated 
under parallel rule that sexually objectifies women by 
demanding exposure of her body, thus rendering the woman 
powerless over her own body (Szymanski, 2011). There is 
alack of research addressing Lebanon’s religious resurgence 
and its impact on citizens’ movements, which requires a review 
of issues relevant to women’s rights and religious resurgence, 
including: (1) What is the status of women in Lebanon and the 
Middle East? (2) Why is it important to understand the status of 
women in Lebanon and the Middle East? (3) What are the 
implications of this study for social policy, social work 
intervention, social research, and social work education? 
 
What is the status of women in Lebanon and the Middle 
East? 
 
Until recently, the status of women, specifically their identity 
and life circumstances, has traditionally been defined 
worldwide in relation to their families, not to the market or the 
community. (Kay, 2000), However, Lebanese women’s 
struggle for political independence and socioeconomic equality 
has been divorced from family law reforms and from laws 
concerning employment discrimination, (Shehadeh, 1998). The 
contemporary legal shift in the status of married women in 
Lebanon is regressing. Women are being forced back into the 
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sole confinement of the private sphere of family lives, away 
from the public arena of community, regional, and national 
affairs that Lebanon’s pre-religious resurgence had provided, 
and where women found a progressive, promising, and 
nurturing milieu, (Herzberg, 2013). 
 
The milestones along this momentous path back in time mark 
the extent that Lebanese women were able to acquirethe 
essential preconditions for social, economic, and political 
independence including education, employment, and equity in 
the labor market. In 2000, even though 50% of the country’s 
population was women, less than 23% of them were employed, 
whereas 31% were employed in 1980. In 2000, the average 
salary of men was 27% to as much as 85% higher than that of 
women, compared to less than 47% higher in 1980. In 2000 the 
illiteracy rate among females age 10 and older was reported to 
be 16%, compared to 2.7% among males. (Lebanese women 
situation in numbers, 2000), A 2003 study reported that in 
2000, 20% of women over age 15 were illiterate compared to 
8% of men over the same age. (Roudi-Fahimi, 2003), A more 
recent report by the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 
2006) notes that in general illiteracy is in decline, but a gap 
remains between men (5.6%) and women (10%).  However, 
about 27% of poor women and 76% of extremely poor women 
do not attend school beyond the sixth standard grade and only 
14% of all women in Lebanon reach the university level. 
(United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 2006), 
 
These statistics are affirmed in the UNDP’s 2000 Human 
Development Report (HDR), in which Lebanon was ranked 101 
out of a total of 175 countries, with a human development 
index (HDI) of 0.757. The 2000 HDR report blamed Lebanon’s 
low ranking on its ethno-religious civil war, violence, and 
instability, (United Nations, 2009). However, if we consider the 
religious resurgence period that began in the last several years, 
it would be appropriate to further examine religious resurgence 
as a possible facilitator of the low HDR ranking.  The decrease 
in Lebanon’s HDI during its religious resurgence is paralleled 
by a decrease in the UNDP standard of living for females, but 
not for males.In 2000 Lebanese women’s UNDP standard of 
living index was 63 and that of men was 74 compared tothe 
UNDP index for 1984, where it was reported at 68 for women 
and 71 for men.   
 
In 2012, the female labor force participation was reported at 
22.6% for females and 70.8% for males. (UNDP Human 
Development Report, 2013), This is a considerable regression 
in the standard of living for women and a widening of the gap 
between women and men (from 3 index points to 11 index 
points) during a time in which both men and women 
experienced the same environmental conditions of civil unrest, 
violence, and religious resurgence. Of the 38 countries, 
including Lebanon, ranked lower in 2000 than in 1984, 35 were 
Muslim Middle-Eastern countries undergoing religious 
resurgence. (United Nations Development Programme, 
2000),According to UNDP annual HDR reports from 1984 to 
2000, 88 women out of 100 were receiving health care during 
pregnancy in the year 2000, whereas 89 women out of 100 
received such health care in 1982.  In 2000, 47% of Lebanese 
women used modern contraceptive measures, whereas in 1984 
more than 52% did. Only two Lebanese women were 
parliamentarians in 2000, whereas three occupied such seats in 
1982. Two women were director generals in 1998, whereas five 
women held such a position in 1984. Two women were 
appointed ambassadors in 1994, while three ascended to this 
rank in 1980. To date, no Lebanese women have ever held 
ministerial or head of municipality positions.  From 2000 to 
2012, although HDI improved slightly for the entire population, 
women continue to fall behind with respect to maternal health, 
empowerment, and economic activity. (UNDP Human 
Development Report, 2013), Most demonstrative of the effects 
of religious resurgence on women’s education, equity, and 
employability in Lebanon are data from the UNDP Statistics 
Division. These data show that Lebanese women in 
professional associations have had one of the lowest increases 
in membership since 1990 (UNDP 1984–2000). (United 
Nations, 2009), Most of the nations that have received such 
regressive evaluations for the same period are Middle Eastern 
Muslim countries undergoing religious resurgence (Syria, 
Libya, and Egypt). The cultural and gender privy constraints of 
religious resurgence are unavoidably coupled with common, 
universal socioeconomic and political impediments that 
contemporary women must overcome in order to regain equity, 
equality, and freedom. 
 
Equally important, this study found strong statistical 
relationships between the number of conservative religious 
parliamentarians and the number of laws enacted to support 
women’s rights. Before Lebanon’s religious resurgence, no 
representative of a religious organization ever held any of 
Lebanon’s 128 parliamentary seats. Between 1990 and 2000, 
12 parliamentarians representing Amal and Hezbullah were 
elected and re-elected in the four Lebanese parliamentary 
elections, as well as 19 representatives of conservative 
Christian-based coalitions. (Schbley, 2002), Ninety-five percent 
of this study’s respondents who indicated an affiliation with a 
religious organization and voted compared to an average of 
71.3% of eligible voters in the Muslim enclaves of Baalbek, 
Bekaa, Hermil, Nabatieh, and South-Lebanon. The total 
national voting average is below 41%, (Lebanese women 
situation in numbers, 2000). This finding is significant because 
it shows the perception of political freedom for voters from a 
very conservative religious affiliation and those from a non-
religious sectors.Since the mobilization of the first Lebanese 
women’s movement in 1953, until Lebanon’s religious 
resurgence in the 1990s, its parliament had enacted seven laws 
granting women limited freedom, equality, and equity rights.  
 
During this same period, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Algiers, 
Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Tunis, and 
Libya each passed fewer than sevenlaws designed to empower 
women with additional civil rights and freedom (UNDP, 1984–
2000). Therefore, except for reforms in IsraelLebanon’s pre-
1990 reforms of women’s civil rights were ahead of all other 
Middle Eastern nations. However, from 1990 to 1995, only 
three laws were passed in Lebanon designed to empower 
women with additional civil rights and freedom (Table 1), 
whereas, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Morocco, Algiers, Jordan, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Tunis, and Libya have 
each passed five or more laws designed to empower women 
with additional civil rights and freedom (UNDP, 1984–2000).  
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Importance of understanding the status of women in 
Lebanon  
 
Although the social and ethno-religious climates in the United 
States are distinguishable from those in Lebanon and the 
Middle East, the impact of religiosity levels on women’s civil 
rights movements, equity, and freedom may be the same. This 
research attempts to contribute to the study of patterns and 
processes of societal changes and the impact of religiosity 
levels on women’s civil rights movements across cultures and 
nations. This study attempted to denote the outcomes of 
religious restraints on women’s movement, freedom of speech, 
civil and human rights, and equality regardless of boundaries, 
cultures, religions, languages, or races. By illustrating the 
extent of ethno-religious constraints on women, it provides an 
impetus for American, Lebanese, and international feminist 
movements to preempt future legislation, political action, or 
movements that seek to curtail women’s freedom in the name 
of religion.  
 
What are the implications for national and international 
social work practice? 
 
Social work research is about delineating the interplay of power 
and empowerment not only among races and socioeconomic 
classes, but also between genders and among religions and 
cultures. This study is an attempt to address the lack of 
knowledge regarding the relationship between religious 
resurgence and women’s movements.  Furthermore, this study 
will address basic knowledge for international workers as they 
work with Muslim populations in various healthcare, political, 
and economical situations. In addition, this study will attempt 
to add to the cumulative knowledge about Middle Eastern 
cultural exegesis and women’s educational and socioeconomic 
situations. Future clinical application of this study should assist 
international health and social workers with the design of 
treatment plans targeted at clients’ oppression and abuse within 
the context of religious insurgence within the Middle East, 
particularly Lebanon. Finally, this study aims to assist in 
assisting preventive measures for future clients and to empower  
social work practitioners to anticipate future impediments to 
their clients’ liberty, freedom, and equity. The implications of 
this study extend beyond clinical walls into the streets, families, 
homes, and businesses of our global village. Illuminating the 
effects of religious resurgence on women’s freedom and human 
rights is crucial for women’s physical and psychosocial 
adjustment, and for progress in developing societies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, it is important to understand the Islamic cultural 
perspectives of the women in this study to further develop a 
culturally sensitive plan for inherent and autonomous change. 
 
STUDY PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
 
The overall hypothesis of this study is that religious resurgence 
and the level of religious fundamentalism in Lebanon will 
indirectly correlate to the strength and the likelihood of 
women’s civil rights and equity movements. The attitude of 
Lebanese women and their movements for civil rights and 
equity will depend directly upon the level of their religiosity, 
self-esteem, and life satisfaction. The following research 
questions are extensions of the primary hypothesis: 
 
1. Will the difference between the means of women’s 
responses/scores on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale. 
(Spence, 1997), increase as the number of conservative 
religious parliamentarians in Lebanon increases, and will the 
number of pubic entities that represent gender equality relative 
to regional and international development decrease? 
 
2. Which group of Lebanese women has higher self-esteem 
scores? Groups are categorized according to the AWS as (1) 
zealots, (2) those with a strong association with religious 
resurgence, (3) those with a tempered association with religious 
resurgence, and (4) those with a weak association with religious 
resurgence. 
 
3. What is the strength of relationship between Lebanese 
women’s religiosity levels (Zealot, Strong Association, 
Tempered Association, Weak Association) and their current 
perception of life satisfaction (very satisfied, satisfied, 
dissatisfied, very dissatisfied)? 
 
MATERIALS AND MATHODS 
 
In the effort to delineate some of the effects of religious 
resurgence on women's freedom and civil rights, the statistical 
significance of the study’s three hypotheses were tested. The 
significance level α was set at 0.05. Both parametric and 
nonparametric correlations were applied for analyses. 
 
Statistical Analyses, Significance, and Post Hoc Tests 
 
H1o: There is no relationship between the means of genders’ 
response/scores on the AWS, the number of conservative 
religious parliamentarians, the number of public entities that 
are forbidden by sharia (dance halls, cabarets) and the number 
Table 1. List of Enacted Laws Addressing Women’s Issues 
 
Before 1990 (Year & Description) After 1990 (Year & Description) 
1952 -- Women acquire the right to vote. 
1960 -- A Lebanese woman married to a foreigner acquires the right to retain her 
Lebanese citizenship if she so chooses. 
1974 -- Women no longer require their husbands' written permission to obtain a 
Lebanese passport. 
1984 -- The use of contraceptives becomes legal through a legislative decree by the 
executive branch. Abortion is still illegal under Lebanese law. 
1986 -- Lebanon ratifies the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), with reservations pertaining to nationality transfer and family laws. 
1987 -- The retirement age (64) becomes equal for both women and men. Before that, it 
was 60 for men and 55 for women. 
1988-- Lebanon ratifies the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, with reservations pertaining to Employment, Civil, and Human Rights. 
1993 -- A female witness becomes equal to a male witness 
in real estate transactions. 
1994 -- Women acquire the right to engage in commerce 
without their husband's authorization. A woman in the 
Lebanese diplomatic corps who marries a foreigner is no 
longer required to quit her position or transfer back to 
Lebanon. 
1995 -- Women acquire the right to take on a life 
insurance policy without their husband's authorization. 
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of laws enacted to support women’s rights in Lebanon. One-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA), followed by a post-hoc 
Bonferroni analysis, allowed this research to analyze mean 
differences between gender scores on the AWS, the number of 
conservative religious parliamentarians, and the number of 
laws enacted to support women’s rights in Lebanon. 
 
H2o: There is no relationship between Lebanese women’s 
religiosity levels and their self-esteem scores.The strength and 
direction of the relationships of these variables were 
determined by a Spearman rho correlation coefficient test.  
 
H3o: There is no relationship between Lebanese women’s 
religiosity levels and their perception of life satisfaction. The 
strength and direction of the relationships of these variables 
were determined by a Spearman rho correlation coefficient. 
 
Speculative Assumptions 
 
Interpretive analysis of this study’s narrative inquiry and testing 
of its three hypotheses is limited by the following five 
speculative assumptions: 
 
1. Lebanon’s religious resurgence was not imposed by foreign 
forces. 
2. Lebanon is an independent and sovereign democracy. 
3. Lebanon’s religious resurgence encompassed all of its 18 
religious sects. 
4. Lebanon’s economy was stable before its religious 
resurgence. 
5. Solutions to Lebanon’s confessional inequities may be 
achieved through its secular/political entities.  
 
Research Instruments  
 
To test this study’s three hypotheses, self-report instruments for 
data collection assessing respondents’ attitudes toward women, 
religiosity levels, self-esteem, and life satisfaction are needed. 
They were designed, formulated, and constructed to be 
implemented by this study.  
 
Attitudes Toward Women Scale Selection and 
Operationalization 
 
For this research, we adapted Spence and Hahn’s 15-item AWS 
scale, supplemented by five additional questions designed and 
formulated by the first author to reflect relevant contemporary 
equity and equality issues. One open-ended question was added 
to permit participants to formulate and express, in their own 
words, their thoughts about their own attitudes toward women 
and perceptions of changes in those attitudes toward women. 
 
Measures of Religiosity, Self-Esteem, and Life Satisfaction 
Levels Questionnaire 
 
The study of religious resurgence in Lebanon must assess the 
religiosity levels of Judeo-Christians and Muslims. However, a 
cursory review of the literature reveals that although several 
researchers have designed and/or implemented a religiosity 
scale, all are based on a belief in Judeo-Christian canons (e.g., 
Duke University Religion Index. To our knowledge, no scales 
have been developed to measure Muslim levels of religiosity, 
self-esteem, and life satisfaction. Thus, the first author 
formulated a cross-religion scale for evaluating Lebanese 
religiosity levels.In addition to assessing religiosity levels, this 
study’s hypotheses called for measures of self-esteem and life 
satisfaction. Hence, the outcomes of this research effort are a 
30-item Religiosity Level Scale (RLS) modeled after O’Neill 
and Kenny’s (1998) measure, a 10-item Self-Esteem Scale 
(SES) adapted from Rosenberg (1979), and a 10-item Life 
Satisfaction Scale in which seven of the items were adapted 
from Gilman and Huebner’s (1997) study, (O’Neill, 1998). A 
Delphi panel of three women and women’s studies experts 
assessed the face and content validity of this study’s AWS and 
RLS scales. This panel was also asked to validate each of the 
supplemental items on the scales according to proportion, 
frequency, and number of criteria. Two of the three judges 
validated each question prior to its inclusion in the final 
versions of the questionnaires. The content validity of the SES 
scale is accepted due to its prior publication and adoption by 
the various researchers identified earlier. 
 
Coding of Answers to the Life Satisfaction Scale  
 
The coding system for the outcomes of Sections III and IV of 
the Life Satisfaction Scale, which “assumes that although 
individuals possess unique self-concept contents, the overall 
structure of self-concept may be common across individuals,” 
was adopted from Gordan et al. (1968). Analyses of 
participants’ comments were thus reduced to simple tabulation 
of frequencies of codes or themes. The sum of this tabulation 
constituted a composite variable that identified a respondent’s 
level of life satisfaction (Chatah et al., 2008) 
Tests for Reliability 
 
A computer-based statistical package for social science 
research programs (SPSS 19.0) was used to assess the 
reliability of this study’s modified instruments. Tests of the 
internal consistency of the AWS and RLS scales were 
conducted on independent samples soon after their design. 
These self-report instruments were presented to 71 students in 
research methods classes at Wichita State University, Wichita, 
Kansas. The average Cronbach alpha for all the items on both 
questionnaires was .76, yielding a strong internal consistency 
for all four matrixes. 
 
Dissemination of Questionnaires 
 
The AWS and RLS questionnaires were distributed to 
prospective subjects in the fall of 1999 and again in the early 
spring and summer of 2004 by the PI and co-investigator. 
During each time period, 142 participants voluntarily signed 
consent forms and returned questionnaires. Thus, a total of 284 
individuals participated in the study. The participants were 
students at the American University in Beirut and the Lebanese 
American University. During each dissemination phase, 
questionnaires were given to prospective respondents with 
envelopes labeled with on-campus addresses.Hence, the 
attitudes of Lebanese university students toward Lebanese 
women provided this study with the point of reference for 
understanding the role of women in Lebanon before and during 
a period of religious insurgence. The two questionnaires were 
seeking to identify the relationships between respondents’ 
levels of religiosity and their levels of self-esteem and life 
satisfaction.  
 
Sample and Sampling Limitations 
 
To address this study’s three research questions, a large sample 
able to accommodate both statistical and practical (cost and 
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feasibility) considerations, as well as fluctuations in 
assumptions and lack of knowledge, was mandated. Thus, this 
study had to overcome issues of time, security, money, and 
other difficulties inherent in attempting to sample a 
heterogeneous post–civil-war population. To date, Lebanon 
remains divided along invisible militarized, sectarian, cultural, 
and socioeconomic boundaries. Most Lebanese homes have yet 
to be equipped with operational utilities and telephone lines. 
Most Lebanese do not speak English and donot receive mail 
service. Lebanon’s 15-year civil war and postwar occupation by 
foreign and factional forces, through which most rations and 
resources are distributed, have rendered its cognitive citizenry 
suspicious of all inquiries and distant from all unfamiliar faces.  
 
Thus, to overcome these significant limitations, this study’s 
self-administered, self-report questionnaires were hand-
delivered to English-speaking students between 18 and 29 years 
of age from middle- to upper-middle-class backgrounds who 
lived with family members, reported strong religious fellowship 
and political membership, and participated in some political 
and/or religious organization.  Although the questionnaires 
were not randomly administered, they yielded vital data that 
were necessary and may be sufficient to test the study’s null 
hypotheses(Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Sample Composition and Demographics (N = 284) 
 
 
Male (n = 91) Female (n = 193) 
1999 2004 1999 2004 
Total 34 57 108 85 
Lebanese Citizen 21 38 98 52 
Voted Before 25 43 108 52 
Ever Been Employed 0 0 5 7 
Married & Engaged 3 12 31 38 
Household Annual 
Income Above $60,000 
29 34 98 79 
Sect/Religion MI = 9 
CP = 1 
MS = 3 
DR = 4 
CC = 3 
CM = 4 
CO = 6 
OT = 4 
MI = 14 
CP = 3 
MS = 12 
DR = 5 
CC = 5 
CM = 6 
CO = 6 
OT = 6 
MI = 27 
CP = 21 
MS = 9 
DR = 2 
CC = 11 
CM = 9 
CO = 12 
OT = 17 
MI = 18 
CP = 6 
MS = 14 
DR = 5 
CC = 9 
CM = 10 
CO = 11 
OT = 12 
 
RESULTS 
 
A significant statistical relationship was found between an 
increase in the number of mosques and churches and a decrease 
in the number of laws for women (p<.01). Furthermore, 
decrease in the number of mixed public gathering entities was 
also found to be significantly reduced since the beginning of 
the period of religious resurgence (p<.01). Since Lebanon’s 
religious resurgence in the early 1990s, most of the residential, 
commercial, and tourist areas have witnessed an overwhelming 
decrease in the number of public entities that provide public 
meeting, entertainment, and social mixing.  This study also 
found strong inverse statistical relationships between the 
number of conservative religious parliamentarians and the 
number of laws enacted to support women’s rights.Among the 
participants in the 1999 survey, the mean difference between 
respondents who expressed egalitarian attitudes toward women 
and those whoexpressed traditional attitudes toward women 
was .2717. The paired t-test yielded a significant difference 
between the two groups with p-value of .009 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Paired-Samples t Tests 
 
Pair 
Paired Differences 
t 
p-value 
(2-tailed) Mean SD 
AWS Traditional vs. 
Egalitarian 1999 Cohorts 
.2717 .92790 2.684 .009 
AWS Traditional vs. 
Egalitarian 2004 Cohorts 
.4823 1.3204 7.1003 .000 
Religious Membership vs. 
Level of Religiosity 
.5048 1.73488 2.667 .005 
Religious Membership vs. 
Level of Self-Esteem 
.9643 1.75279 5.042 .000 
Religious Membership vs. 
Level of Life Satisfaction 
.9553 1.8969 5.298 .000 
Levels of Religiosity vs. Self-
Esteem 
−.4595 .44201 −9.528 .000 
Levels of Religiosity vs. Life 
Satisfaction 
−.2738 .73366 −3.421 .001 
 
Among the 2004 participants, the mean difference between 
respondents who expressed egalitarian attitudes toward women 
and those who expressed traditional attitudes toward women 
was .4823.  When the mean difference among the 2004 
participants was compared to that of the 1999 participants, the 
outcomes from this comparison permitted us to infer that the 
difference in the traditional and egalitarian attitudes toward 
women increased significantly from 1999 to 2004. The 
independent two-sample t-tests comparing the mean scores 
between 1999 and 2004 are both significant at α = .05 in 
traditional and egalitarian groups, respectively (Table 4).   
 
Table 4. Independent Samples Tests (1999 versus 2004) 
 
 
t-test 
Mean Difference t p-value (2-tailed) 
AWS Traditional .105 3.403 .042 
AWS Egalitarian 1.213 14.180 .001 
 
ANOVA and post-hoc Bonferroni analyses confirmed the 
significant difference between the means of respondents who 
expressed egalitarian attitudes and those who expressed 
traditional attitudes toward women regarding the number of 
conservative religious parliamentarians, the number of public 
entities for gender mixing, and the number of laws enacted to 
support women’s rights in Lebanon. These five mean 
differences were tightly clustered and highly significant, with 
p-values <.01 and test statistics F varying from 12.999 to 
26.849 (Table 5).These outcomes suggest that the number of 
bars, cabarets, and laws favoring women’s equalityandfreedom 
are uniform, homogeneous, and predictive of the number of 
conservative religious parliamentarians and differences in 
attitudes toward women.  
 
Table 5. Anova 
 
Between-groups Unweighted and 
Weighted Scales 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F p-
value 
Questions Favoring Conservative 
Positions 
.875 .875 12.999 .006 
Questions Favoring Egalitarian 
Positions 
1.021 1.021 21.349 .000 
Regression of the number of bars 
(Predictors) of the difference in 
attitudes. 
11.123 11.123 20.991 .000 
Regression of the number of 
cabarets (Predictors) of the 
difference in attitudes. 
12.495 12.495 26.760 .000 
Regression of the number of laws 
(Predictors) of the difference in 
attitudes. 
12.121 12.122 26.849 .000 
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The nonparametric Cochran Odds Ratio test was selected to 
determine which group of Lebanese women (the zealot, those 
with strong association with religious resurgence, those with 
tempered association with religious resurgence, and those with 
weak association with religious resurgence) has higher self-
esteem and life satisfaction scores. This test is ideal for the 
analysis of matched subjects and permits us to infer that 
Lebanese women with weak association with religious 
resurgence have self-reported the highest self-esteem (4.09) 
and life satisfaction (4.59) scores; most of these women were 
Protestant Christians. Concomitantly, Lebanese women who 
self-reported zealot religiosity levels also self-reported the 
lowest levels of self-esteem (1.19). The majority of this group 
were from the Muslim Shi’a sect. Concurrent with these two 
groups, Lebanese women who self-reported strong association 
with religious resurgence also self-reported the lowest levels of 
life satisfaction (1.32). The majority of this group were from 
the Muslim Sunni sect (Tables 3 and 6). 
 
Table 6: Means of Respondents’ Religiosity, Self-Esteem, and Life 
Satisfaction Levels (Homogeneity assessed with Cochran Odds 
Ratio Tests) 
 
Respondents who Self-
Reported Religiosity 
Level of: 
Self-Reported Levels 
of Self-Esteem 
Self-Reported Levels 
of Life Satisfaction 
Zealot 1.19 (Lowest) 2.78 
Strong Association 1.98 1.32 (Lowest) 
Tempered Association 2.91 3.56 
Weak Association 4.09 4.59 
 
Hence, the outcomes of these Cochran post-hoc tests and those 
described in Table 3 permit us to reject our second and third 
null hypotheses, and conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between Lebanese women’s religiosity levels and 
their levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our study found that gender equity improved in some areasfor 
Muslim Lebanese women since the beginning of religious 
resurgence from 1999 to 2004 and declined in other areas such 
as health care, political office holdings, and education.  A 2004 
Shadow Report published by CEDAW (National Committee 
for the Follow-up on Women’s Issues, 2007) recognized some 
improvements since 1999 in increased female involvement in 
the public sector and in the judiciary. However, only 3 of 128 
deputies in the government were women and that number has 
not changed into 2012. Women’s participation remained at 
2.3%, one of the lowest rates in the world. According to the 
2004 report, illiteracy rates continued to drop through 2012, 
but the rate among women continued to be higher than the rate 
among men and women employed in the workforce continued 
to be over 50% lower than their male counterparts. Age and 
location continue to be significant factors, with older and rural 
women having the highest illiteracy rates and unemployment 
outside the home. An encouraging note is that the gap is 
narrowing in younger age groups. Nevertheless, overall the 
2004 report concluded that gender equity has not become a 
reality.CEDAW published another Shadow Report in 2007 
(National Committee for the Follow-up on Women’s Issues, 
2007). After reviewing the same aspects of gender as they had 
in 2004, the authors concluded: “The information we revealed 
in this report proves the fragility of the ads and procedures 
which the government adopted since 2004 until today. The 
ministerial statement which allocated a paragraph for women is 
still ink on aper” (p. 74).Sadly, a recent United Nations report 
(2009) reinforces this conclusion. According to this report, 
despite some progress, both the HDI and the Gender 
Development Index (GDI) demonstrate ongoing inequalities 
between men and women. For example, illiteracy levels remain 
higher among women than among men. 
 
There is a note of encouragement in this report that female 
students outnumber male students at both secondary and 
tertiary education levels.More specifically, the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM), which evaluates women’s 
opportunities rather than their capabilities, suggests that gender 
equity is far from being achieved. The GEM measures three 
aspects of gender inequality: political participation, economic 
participation, and power over economic resources. In 1992 the 
GEM for women was 0.212, reflecting a very low level of 
achievement in these three areas. According to the UN report 
(2009), in 1992 Lebanon ranked 103 out of 116 countries 
evaluated. By 2008 the GEM for Lebanese women had risen to 
0.350, still not a satisfactory improvement. The UN report 
acknowledges some improvements in the judicial area, where 
the number of female justices doubled between 1995 and 2004, 
from 55 to 107, while the number of male justices remained 
about the same (from 291 to 307). Nevertheless, the gap 
remains significant. 
 
The UN report notes some increased control of women over 
economic resources related to greater participation in the work 
force and higher rates of academic enrollment. Nevertheless, 
the report states: “there are still possibilities for improvement, 
particularly given the levels of female graduates at the tertiary 
level, the increasing level of female participation in the labor 
force, and the rising number of female entrepreneurs” (p. 55). 
Moreover, “despite considerable gains, gender empowerment 
at decision-making levels remains pitifully low, particularly 
when the comparatively high levels of females enrolled in and 
graduating from tertiary level education are considered” (p. 
58).More broadly, gender inequity continues to be reflected in 
laws related to citizenship rights. For example, a non-Lebanese 
woman who marries a Lebanese man is automatically granted 
residency and nationality. Children from such a marriage are 
also granted nationality automatically. On the other hand, a 
non-Lebanese man who marries a Lebanese woman is not 
automatically granted residency or nationality. He will be 
granted residency “only if he certifies that he will not engage in 
remunerated jobs, proves that he has a monthly income of LL5 
million from transfers or pension fund and provides a bank 
statement proving he has an excess of LL300 million” (p. 59). 
If the man cannot gain residency on these terms, he becomes 
stateless or an illegal resident, as are any children born to the 
marriage. 
 
The study has several limitations. As noted at the beginning, 
there is a lack of comparative cross-cultural research. In 
addition, the surveys were conducted only with students, so 
education and age factors also limit the generalizability of the 
findings reported here. Nevertheless,this study suggests that 
Muslim religious resurgence is biased against women. The data 
reported here permit the inference that women’s movements 
during Muslim religious resurgence have experienced and will 
continue to experience major challenges to attaining equality 
and equity in the labor force, and in maintaining civil rights, 
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human rights, freedom of speech, suffrage, and political 
representation. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Recent dramatic events in the Middle East may require a re-
categorization of some countries including Syria and Egypt. 
2. Defined in the U.S. Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1983, and 
1984, and in the U.S. Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
3. Due to Lebanon’s republican form of government, its 
presidents and ministers may only be elected from the ranks of 
its parliamentarians. Both Amal and Hizbullah are Muslim 
Shi’a religious organizations. 
4. As reported in a major Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar, on 
September 6, 1992; September 15, 1996; and September 3, 
2000, respectively, in the aftermath of three Lebanese national 
parliamentary elections. 
5. Seven items of Gordon’s (1968) nine-category coding system 
were employed to compartmentalize some of the study 
participants’ self-reported assessments: (1) ascribed 
characteristics and material-physical self; (2) roles and 
memberships; (3) activities and interests; (4) abstract 
identification; (5) systemic self-reflection; (6) interpersonal 
social self; and (7) reference to the external situation.  
6. Churches, mosques, dance halls, and cabarets were selected 
because they are readily visible indicators that may be used to 
measure religious resurgence. Business listings in phone books 
from 1990 and 2004 were used to deduce these numeric 
observations. 
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